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I. INTRODUCTION
A Minnesota plaintiff with a fraud claim has many options to 
choose from in determining what counts to include in a court 
complaint.  One of the most popular in Minnesota is a claim under 
Minnesota’s Consumer Fraud Statute, in part because the gold at the 
† Nancy Brasel is a partner at Greene Espel, PLLP, in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
where she practices in the areas of business litigation, securities litigation, and 
employment law and litigation.
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end of that particular rainbow can include attorneys’ fees, through a 
statutory device known as the Private Attorney General (“AG”) 
Statute.  Claims under the Private AG Statute are ostensibly brought 
in the stead of Minnesota’s attorney general, on the theory that a 
private plaintiff should be rewarded for standing in the shoes of other 
defrauded Minnesota plaintiffs. Ten years ago, the Minnesota
Supreme Court appeared to take the view that in order to bring a 
claim under this statute, it was not necessary for a plaintiff to confer a 
benefit to the public.1  The court’s decision came despite a call from 
Justice John Simonett that it was “time to look more closely” at the 
statute, which in his opinion required a plaintiff to prove a public 
benefit.2
Two years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court heeded Justice 
Simonett’s call, reversed itself and held that a private action under 
the Private AG Statute is only available if it will benefit the public.3
The court did not, however, specify what particular benefits to the 
public warranted use of the Private AG Statute.  Currently, there 
remains little guidance about what circumstance might constitute a 
“public benefit” that would turn a private fraud claim into a
consumer fraud claim under the Private AG Statute.
II. MINNESOTA LAW: THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTE
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
A. Statutory Scheme
The Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act is one of several consumer 
protection statutes enacted in Minnesota to prohibit deceptive 
practices in the sale of merchandise.4  The consumer protection 
statutes do not by themselves provide for a private cause of action. 
Instead, it is the Private AG Statute that provides “any person injured 
by a violation” of these statutes5 “may bring a civil action and recover 
1. See infra Part II.B.
2. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 9 
(Minn. 1992); see infra Part II.B.
3. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000); see infra Part II.C.
4. The Consumer Fraud Act is found at MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.68-70 (2000).
Two similar statutes are the False Statement in Advertisement Act, MINN. STAT. § 
325F.67 (2000), and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, MINN. STAT. § 325D.44 
(2000).
5. The Private AG Statute provides remedies for a greater number of statutes 
than the three listed above. See infra note 7.
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damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of 
investigation and reasonable attorney’s fees.”6 Section 8.31 of
Minnesota Statutes is actually entitled “Additional Duties of the 
Attorney General,” and it provides the attorney general with the 
authority to investigate and enforce several statutes that regulate 
“unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, 
commerce, or trade.”7
B. The Consumer Fraud Act is Not Limited to Individual Consumers
In 1992, in Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro,8 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether a building owner
could receive attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute.  In Watpro,
the Church of the Nativity of Our Lord brought an action to recover 
damages resulting from defective roofing materials installed on the 
church’s school and convent.9  At the trial court level, the jury found 
the manufacturer of the materials liable to the church on a number 
of claims, including claims under the Minnesota Consumer Fraud 
Act.10 The trial court entered a judgment for the church for over 
$358,000, including approximately $121,000—over one third of the 
church’s total recovery—in attorneys’ fees and investigation costs.11
On appeal, the manufacturer argued that the Consumer Fraud 
Act was intended to protect only individual or unsophisticated 
consumers, and that the attorneys’ fees and investigation costs award 
was therefore unwarranted.12  The court of appeals rejected this 
argument, holding that the statute “does not limit recovery to 
unsophisticated consumers,” and that “case law has not limited the 
6. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subd. 3(a) (2000).
7. MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subd. 1 (2000).  These statutes include the Nonprofit 
Corporation Act (sections 317A.001 to 317A.909), the Act Against Unfair
Discrimination and Competition (sections 325D.01 to 325D.07), the Unlawful Trade 
Practices Act (sections 325D.09 to 325D.15), the Antitrust Act (sections 325D.49 to 
325D.66), section 325D.67 and other laws against false or fraudulent advertising, the 
antidiscrimination acts contained in section 325D.67, the act against monopolization 
of food products (section 325D.68), the act regulating telephone advertising services 
(section 325D.39), the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (325F.68 to 325F.70), and 
chapter 53A regulating currency exchanges. Id.
8. 491 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1992).
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 8 n.14.
12. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 474 N.W.2d 605, 611-12
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991), aff’d, 491 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1992).
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scope of the statute to consumer transactions.”13  The supreme court 
agreed, using both the Consumer Fraud Act and the Private AG 
Statute in its analysis.  The court held that the Consumer Fraud Act 
“does not expressly limit its application to individual consumers,” and 
applies “to transactions involving all consumers.”14
The court did not directly address—-and it appears the
defendant did not make—-any argument that the Private AG Statute 
did not allow a private cause of action because the statute required a 
public benefit.  The court did address the purpose of the Private AG 
Statute, however, and held that it applied to these circumstances.
“The purpose of the private attorney general statute is to ‘eliminate 
financial barriers to the vindication of a plaintiff’s rights . . . and to 
provide incentive for counsel to act as private attorney general.’”15
These purposes applied to the Church’s circumstances, according to 
the court, because the Church’s “pursuit of a remedy has involved 
much time and labor; it has been difficult, lengthy and expensive.”16
Moreover, given the monetary award to the church, “[i]f there are no 
attorney fees awarded in this case, Nativity will spend virtually all of its 
damage award paying its attorneys.”17  The court noted that the 
Private AG Statute was thus “intended to cover just this type of case.”18
Three justices, however, disagreed with the majority on the 
award of attorneys’ fees, urging that the case required the court to 
“look more closely at the so-called ‘Private Attorney General
Statute,’”19 and asking, “[D]oes every false promise, every
13. Id. at 612.
14. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 8.  The defendant also argued that the plaintiff’s 
breach of warranty claim should have been rejected because the plaintiff did not 
satisfy the notice requirements of MINN. STAT. § 336.2-607(3)(a), and that the action 
was barred by the statute of limitations.  The court of appeals rejected both of these 
arguments, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 4-7.  The defendant 
also argued that the church was a “sophisticated merchant,” making the transaction 
between the parties solely within the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 
7.  The court of appeals also rejected this argument, and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court affirmed, holding that the transaction was “an ordinary consumer transaction
within the scope of state statutes regulating sales to consumers.” Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.  The court focused on the attorneys’ fees recovery because in Watpro, as 
in many cases, the Private AG Statute is significant mainly for its inclusion of 
attorneys’ fees.  In Watpro, as in other cases, the plaintiff brought claims for common 
law fraud and misrepresentation as well as under the Consumer Fraud Act.  Thus, its 
recovery of damages was covered by findings under these common law tort claims, 
making the Private AG statute important because of the large attorneys’ fees award.
19. Id. at 9 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4
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misrepresentation, or every misleading statement carry with it an 
entitlement to attorney fees?  I think not.”20
The dissent, authored by Justice John Simonett, advocates that 
the Private AG Statute and the Consumer Fraud Act must be read 
together.  The Consumer Fraud Act was “meant to protect consumers 
being hoodwinked by sales promotion scams.”21  The Private AG 
Statute was enacted “[b]ecause the attorney general’s office does not 
have the resources to pursue all deceptive practices, and because an 
aggrieved consumer may lack the resources to sue, particularly when 
the claim is small and suit expense is high.”22  Thus, “the legislature 
has authorized an award of attorney fees to give the disadvantaged 
consumer access to the courts and an incentive to assist in the 
curtailing of consumer fraud practices.”23
According to the Watpro dissent, a consumer’s lack of resources 
does not automatically render the Private AG Statute applicable.
Instead, the Private AG Statute should work to place some limits on 
the Consumer Fraud Act, because “enterprising plaintiffs,
understandably interested in recovering investigation costs and 
attorney fees, may expand the Consumer Fraud Act beyond its 
intended scope.”24 This expansion was not envisioned by the
legislature.  As Justice Simonett pointed out, the Consumer Fraud Act 
differs from a common law fraud action in that it is not directed at 
isolated fraud, but rather at a wider body of deceptive practices that 
may be enjoined before they harm consumers.  Moreover, also unlike 
its common law counterpart, the Consumer Fraud Act does not 
require a plaintiff actually to be deceived.  Finally, the Private AG 
Statute, by including “costs of investigation” in its recovery, indicates 
that it is not intended to cover every claim of fraud brought by civil 
litigants.25
20. Id. at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice 
Coyne joined in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Simonett, and Justice 
Tomljanovich joined Justice Simonett’s partial dissent. Id. at 11.
21. Id.  One of the main issues in Watpro was whether the Act applied to all 
consumers, even if, like the church, they were not individual consumers. Id. at 8.
Since the “Act does not expressly limit its application to individual consumers,” the 
majority held that the Act did not exclude the church, in part because the church was 
a consumer and not a merchant under the U.C.C. Id.  Justice Simonett agreed: “Read 
literally, ‘any person’ means just that.” Id. at 9 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).
22. Id. at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 10-11. Moreover, as the Watpro dissent points out, an expansion of the 
5
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The dissent’s idea was not a new one to Minnesota courts.  In 
1984, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that “special factors” 
applied to recoveries under the Private AG Statute.26  These “special 
factors” related to the purpose behind awarding attorneys’ fees under 
the statute: the award should “eliminate financial barriers to the 
vindication of a plaintiff’s rights,” provide “incentive for counsel to 
act as private attorney general,” and  the award “must take into 
account the degree to which the public interest is advanced by the 
suit.”27 Otherwise, the court of appeals announced, “every artful 
counsel could dress up his dog bite case to come under an attorney’s 
fees statute.”28 The Watpro dissent built on the third “public interest” 
factor.  According to the Watpro dissent and the cases preceding it, 
the Private AG Statute should not and does not cover “ad hoc 
deceptions arising in private disputes.”29 Instead, the dissent
suggested that a claim or a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act 
should be allowed under the Private AG Statute only if the following 
test is met:
(1) the plaintiff must be a consumer, who is
(2) injured by an actionable fraud (such as in a common law 
action for a false pretense, a false promise, or a
misrepresentation), and
(3) the fraud must have the potential to deceive and ensnare 
members of the consumer public other than just the
plaintiff, so that
(4) plaintiff’s lawsuit has been of benefit to the public.30
Private AG Statute could reverse the common law rule in the United States that 
litigants pay their own attorneys’ fees.  “[I]f there is to be a wholesale change in 
awarding attorney fees, it should be done by express legislation.” Watpro, 491 N.W.2d 
at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26. Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).  In Liess, the 
plaintiff sued an individual defendant and a real estate company for fraud in 
connection with the sale of a home.  At trial, the jury found fraud by special verdict, 
and the plaintiff moved for attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute. Id. at 557.
The trial court awarded attorneys’ fees, considering factors enumerated in State v. 
Paulson, 290 Minn. 371, 188 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. 1971), to determine the size of the 
award, but it did not take into account the purpose of the Private AG Statute.  The 
court of appeals remanded the case for consideration of both the Paulson factors and 
the policies supporting the Private AG Statute. Id. at 558.
27. Liess, 354 N.W.2d at 558.
28. Id. (quoting Boland v. City of Rapid City, 315 N.W.2d 496, 503 (S.D. 1982)); 
see also Wexler v. Bros. Entm’t Group, 457 N.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) 
(“When awarding attorney fees under the private attorney general statute, the trial 
court must consider the public interest policies underlying the statute.”).
29. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 10.
30. Id. at 11.  These requirements, according to the dissent, “would meet the 
6
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Put another way, a plaintiff should be a consumer injured by 
actionable fraud that has the potential to deceive other consumers so 
that the lawsuit has benefited the public.31  Though this test echoes 
the concern of the court of appeals in cases both before and after 
Watpro,32 it has not been widely used, and until 2000, Minnesota 
courts did not uniformly require plaintiffs to prove a “public benefit” 
to bring claims under the Private AG Statute.33
C. Ly v. Nystrom: Public Benefit Required
In 2000, the Minnesota Supreme Court revisited the issue raised 
by the dissent in Watpro, and reversed itself, at least on the issue of 
attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute. In Ly v. Nystrom,34 the
court held that the Private AG Statute applies only to claimants who 
demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.35  Noting
that the Watpro court affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees but “did 
not engage in analysis as to public benefit,” the court stated, “[t]o the 
extent that [Watpro] could be construed to permit recovery under the 
Private AG Statute without proof of public benefit, it is overruled.”36
worthy purposes of the ‘Private Attorney General Statute’ while at the same time 
keeping the payment of investigation costs and attorney fees within reasonable 
bounds.” Id.
31. Control Data Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., Nos. C6-93-472, C2-93-579,
1993 WL 405303, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1993), rev. denied (Dec. 22, 1993) 
(interpreting the Watpro dissent).
32. See supra notes 26, 28.
33. After the supreme court’s decision in Watpro, some courts did pick up on the 
dissent’s idea. See, e.g., Gray v. Conrad, Nos. C7-97-1784, CO-98-177, 1998 WL 404951, 
at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 1998), rev. denied (Oct. 20, 1998) (holding that the 
district court erred in its award of attorneys’ fees because the case was “fact-specific”
and “the protection of public consumers” was not implicated in the case); Untiedt v. 
Grand Lab, Inc., Nos. C4-94-772, C0-94-851, 1994 WL 714308, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Dec. 27, 1994) (holding that because the trial court found that the cause of action 
would advance the public interest, the trial court considered the appropriate factors); 
Control Data Corp., 1993 WL 405303, at *6 (upholding denial of an attorneys’ fees 
award in part because the court “fail[ed] to see how [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit was of 
benefit to the public”).
34. 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000).
35. Id. at 314.
36. Id. at 314 n.25.  Justice Page and Justice Gilbert each dissented from this 
holding, arguing that the unambiguous language of the Private AG Statute imposes 
no public benefit requirement. See id. at 315 (“Had the legislature intended to limit 
the scope of [the Private AG Statute] to those causes of action that have a public 
benefit, it could have easily done so.  Whether for good or for ill, by the plain words 
of the statute, it did not.”) (Page, J., concurring in part); id. (agreeing that the 
majority “artificially engrafts a ‘public benefit’ requirement onto an unambiguous 
statute”) (Gilbert, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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In this landmark case, the plaintiff Ly purchased a restaurant 
from Nystrom, allegedly based on Nystrom’s representations about 
gross monthly revenues and profits.37 After operating the restaurant 
at a loss for six months, Ly brought suit against Nystrom for common 
law fraud and violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.  At trial, the 
district court concluded that Nystrom was liable to Ly for common 
law fraud, but held that there was no violation of the Consumer 
Fraud Act (and therefore no attorneys’ fees) because the fraudulent 
representations were made from one individual to another, not to a 
large number of consumers, and the representations did not have the 
potential to deceive other consumers.38
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s determination that 
the Consumer Fraud Act and the Private AG Statute did not apply. 
The court of appeals reasoned that though consumer fraud statutes 
were to be construed liberally, the Consumer Fraud Act does not 
apply to business transactions between individuals:
Even if the Act applies more broadly than common law 
fraud, it still only applies in consumer fraud situations and 
the fraud or misrepresentation must be disseminated to 
others.  This was a one-on-one business transaction.  If we 
were to adopt the appellant’s interpretation of the statute, 
virtually every fraudulent transaction would come under 
the consumer fraud umbrella.39
The supreme court affirmed this holding with an analysis of both
the Consumer Fraud Act and the Private AG Statute.40  With regard to 
37. Ly v. Nystrom, 602 N.W.2d 644, 645 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 615 N.W.2d 302 (Minn. 2000).
38. Id. at 645-46.
39. Id. at 647.  The court also determined that Ly did not meet the definition of 
a consumer under the Consumer Fraud Act, because “he bought the restaurant with 
the intent to produce, manufacture, and resell food, rather than with the intent of 
direct ownership of the product.” Id. at 647.  The Consumer Fraud Act itself does not 
define “consumer.”  The court relied on the dictionary definition that defines  a 
“consumer” as “one that acquires goods or services for direct use or ownership rather 
than for resale or use in production or manufacturing.” Id. (quoting THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1238 (3d ed. 1996)).
40. The court reversed the court of appeals’ determination that Ly was not a 
“consumer.” Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 309-10.
While the CFA does not define ‘consumer,’ the legislative history 
clearly indicates that the CFA was intended to protect a broad, 
though not limitless, range of individuals from fraudulent and 
deceptive trade practices, and our decisions have also recognized 
the breadth of its coverage . . . . Thus, viewing appellant as a 
‘consumer’ under the CFA does not push application of the 
statute onto new ground.
8
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the Consumer Fraud Act, the supreme court determined that a 
plaintiff may have a claim under the act even “in the context of an 
isolated one-on-one transaction.”41
Though the Consumer Fraud Act may apply in such a
circumstance, the Private AG Statute—which provides the remedy—is
another matter.  The court correctly noted that the plain language of 
the Private AG Statute, along with its sweeping remedies, “ha[s] 
raised concern about how broadly the legislature intended the statute 
to be applied, particularly as it relates to common law fraud actions 
and the recovery of attorney fees.”42
Analyzing the legislative history of the Private AG Statute, the 
court determined that “the legislature could not have intended to 
sweep every private dispute based on fraud, and falling within the 
Consumer Fraud Act, into a statute where attorney fees and
additional costs and expenses would be awarded . . . .”43  Thus, 
consistent with the history and purpose of the office of the attorney 
general, the court imposed a public benefit requirement on
claimants who wish to bring claims under the statute.  Since Ly was 
defrauded in a “one-on-one transaction” in which the fraudulent 
misrepresentation was made only to him, the public benefit
requirement was not met, and the court of appeals’ holding was 
affirmed.44
D. Post-Ly: Recognizing a Public Benefit When You See One
After the court’s decision in Ly v. Nystrom, the public benefit 
requirement of the Private AG Statute has, perhaps, raised more 
questions than it has answered.  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
recently noted that no published Minnesota case sets forth a standard 




42. Id. at 311.  The court cited the Watpro dissent’s argument “that a consumer 
can claim attorney fees for ‘almost any commercial transaction that fails.’” Id.
(quoting Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1992)) (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 314.
44. Id.
45. Collins v. Minn. Sch. of Bus., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), 
rev. granted (Minn. Feb. 28, 2002). Collins addressed the Private AG Statute and a false 
advertising claim.  There, the plaintiffs claimed that the school’s claims about their 
program consisted of false advertising.  The court reversed the denial of a request for 
9
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In Ly itself, the court focused on the individual nature of the 
transaction at issue, noting that “the fraudulent misrepresentation, 
while evincing reprehensible conduct, was made only to appellant.”46
Under Ly, it seems clear that the class of cases involving one-on-one
transactions will by definition fail to meet the public benefit
requirement.
In a recent federal court case, the court looked not at the nature 
of the transaction, but at the damages sought by the plaintiff.  There, 
the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the 
Private AG Statute because “the essence of [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit is 
personal injury.”47  Despite an argument by the plaintiff that the 
fraudulent misrepresentations were disseminated widely, the court 
determined that claims for the type of damages sought by the 
plaintiff—medical expenses, pain and suffering, wage loss, and 
emotional distress—“are not brought for the benefit of the public,” 
and therefore the plaintiff’s claims under the Consumer Fraud Act 
and the False Advertising Act were dismissed.48
In false advertising cases, the courts’ treatment of the public 
benefit rule has also been difficult to predict. Collins v. Minnesota 
School of Business, a 2002 Minnesota Court of Appeals case upon which 
review has been granted, suggests that the existence of a false 
advertising claim by itself will meet the public benefit requirement 
attorneys’ fees under the Private AG Statute, following federal courts that have 
“consistently held that the prevention of false or misleading advertising is a public 
benefit.” Id. at 820 (citing cases).  Since the school advertised its program to “the 
public at large,” the court held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a public benefit.
Id. at 821.
46. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 314.  The Ly court also cited analyses by other courts 
emphasizing that a public benefit is not conferred in a one-on-one transaction. See
Cooperman v. R.G. Barry Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding 
that the statute is not to be read so broadly that it is “applicable to any contract 
remotely related to the ultimate sale of merchandise”) (quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 
312 n.18); Brody v. Finch Univ. of Health Sciences, 698 N.E.2d 257, 268-69 (Ill Ct. 
App. 1998) (holding that the Consumer Fraud Act of Illinois did not apply to basic 
breach of contract cases) (cited in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 312 n.18).
47. Pecarina v. Tokai Corp., No. CUV, 01-1655, 2002 WL 1023153, *5 (D. Minn. 
May 20, 2002).  In Pecarina, the plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer of a 
non-child-resistant version of the Aim ‘n Flame lighter, after her children started a 
fire with the device and suffered burns. Id. at *1.
48. Id. at *5. Pecarina demonstrates that while the issue under the Private AG 
Statute is often framed only in the context of a request for attorneys’ fees, the impact 
of the rule is much broader.  The Private AG Statute is the only vehicle for bringing a
private cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act or the False Advertising Act (as 
well as the other statutes cited in the Private AG statute). MINN. STAT. § 8.31, subd. 
3(a) (2000); see also supra note 7.  As illustrated by Pecarina, these causes of action 
cannot be maintained without proof of a public benefit.
10
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because “the prevention of false or misleading advertising is a public 
benefit.”49  The federal district court, however, has not followed this 
rule to the letter, rejecting a claim for attorneys’ fees in a false 
advertising case in which the claim was brought by a competitor that 
had used the same tactics in its own advertising.50  The court noted 
that while there is “no doubt” that some public interest is furthered by 
the elimination of false advertising, the award of fees is unwarranted 
as a matter of equity where the plaintiff has engaged in similar 
behavior.51
The results of these cases are not necessarily inconsistent, and by 
themselves may not be troubling.  But the lack of precise standards 
used by the courts in determining whether the requirement in Ly is 
met has not lent much guidance to trial courts, who are left to apply a 
version of Justice Potter Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” theory to 
the public benefit rule.52
E. Clues to a Public Benefit: Purposes of the Private
Attorney General Statute
In the search for standards by which to judge a public benefit, it 
is useful to start where the Ly court started before it imposed the 
requirement—-with the purposes behind the Private AG Statute 
itself.53  Moreover, while the Ly court did not adopt specific standards, 
its reliance on past cases provides hints to its definition of a public 
benefit.
49. 636 N.W.2d 816, 820-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev. granted (Minn. Feb. 28, 
2002).  The Collins court, which relied on several federal court holdings for its 
holding, noted that the defendant “advertised its program to the public at large,” and 
that “but for [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit, an indefinite class of potential consumers might 
have been injured in the same manner as were appellants.” Id. at 821.
50. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Serv., Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1054-55
(D. Minn. 2001), aff’d in relevant part, 290 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
51. Transclean, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.  The Transclean court only applied this 
ruling to the request for attorneys’ fees, allowing the false advertising claim to stand.
The court noted, “Notwithstanding Transclean’s entitlement to damages, attorney’s 
fees under the Private AG Statute are discretionary with the Trial Court.” Id. at 1055 
(internal citations omitted).  Though the defendant did not argue that it was entitled 
to summary judgment based on the court’s public benefit theory, the court addressed 
the argument, and noted that “different considerations influence our ascertainment 
of a reasonable fee award.” Id. at 1057 n.5.  Thus, the jury’s award on damages 
“should not be further enhanced by a fee award.” Id.
52. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
53. See Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 310-14 (Minn. 2000) (discussing the 
history and purpose of the Private AG Statute).
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1. Standing in the Shoes of the Attorney General: Advancing the 
“State Interest”
First, the purpose of the private remedies provided for in the 
statute lies in its broader context: the Private AG Statute is a part of 
the statute defining the duties of the Minnesota Attorney General.
Thus, a private litigant necessarily acts as “a substitute for the attorney 
general.”54  The attorney general, in turn, can only appear in civil 
lawsuits “whenever, in the attorney general’s opinion, the interests of 
the state require it.”55  Since the duty of the attorney general’s office is 
“the protection of public rights and the preservation of the interests 
of the state,” a private litigant cannot bring an action in the shoes of 
the attorney general without serving this purpose as well.56
Unfortunately, it is almost as difficult to define the “interests of the 
state” as it is to define “public benefit.”  While this statutory purpose 
does not lend itself to concrete standards, it is crucial to remember 
that the Private AG Statute begins with the premise that a private 
litigant stands in the shoes of the attorney general, and therefore can 
bring a claim only when the attorney general would do so.
2. Needs Analysis: Elimination of Financial Barriers
Second, part of the legislative intent behind the Private AG 
Statute is to “eliminate financial barriers to the vindication of a 
plaintiff’s rights.”57  Thus, in Watpro, the court determined that the 
purpose of the Private AG Statute had been met in part by comparing 
54. Id. at 311.  State Senator Winston Borden, author of the bill, stated: “It’s 
simply impossible for the Attorney General’s Office to investigate and prosecute every 
act of consumer fraud in this state.”  Hearing on S.F. 819, S. Comm. Labor and 
Commerce, 68th Minn. Leg., Mar. 8, 1973 (audio tape) (comments of Sen. Borden), 
quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311.  Thus, “if a[n] individual could bring an action, he 
can do some of the prosecuting, he can do some of the enforcing, he can provide 
some of the protection for himself and others that the Attorney General’s Office ...
can not do today.” Id.
55. MINN. STAT. § 8.01, quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313; accord Slezak v. 
Ousdigian, 260 Minn. 303, 110 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1961) (holding that the attorney 
general “has the authority to institute in a district court a civil suit in the name of the 
state whenever the interests of the state so require”) (emphasis added), quoted in Ly, 615 
N.W.2d at 313.
56. See Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313 (noting that it is “clear that the sweep of the statute 
can be no broader than the source of its authority—that of the attorney general—
whose duties are to protect public rights in the interest of the state”).
57. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 
1992) (quoting Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), 
quoted in Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311.
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the cost of the suit with the damages recovered.  This comparison led 
the court to conclude that without an award of attorneys’ fees, the 
plaintiff would have spent “virtually all of its damage award paying its 
attorneys,” and the Private AG Statute “was intended to cover just this 
type of case.”58
The difficulty with this analysis is that while the elimination of 
financial barriers may have been a purpose behind the Private AG 
Statute, consideration of the cost of a suit to an individual plaintiff 
does not ensure that the public will benefit from the suit.  In Watpro,
the dissent argued that regardless of the individual plaintiff’s 
monetary need for an attorneys’ fees award, the public was not 
benefited merely because of this need.59  Indeed, if this were the only 
requirement, the Private AG Statute could render a major change in 
the American rule that parties are responsible for their own
attorneys’ fees.60  In Ly, the court did not consider any type of needs 
analysis, perhaps recognizing that a true public benefit requires more 
than a showing of need on the part of an individual plaintiff, and 
more than a comparison of the award of damages versus the cost of 
suit.
3. A Broader Audience Than One: Preventing Widespread Fraud
Third, the most significant purpose of the Private AG Statute, 
identifiable from the legislative history and case law, is to prosecute
claims of fraud on behalf of others.  One legislator noted that the law 
was intended to stop those who “rip off a large number of citizens.”61
The Ly court cited and recognized this purpose as central behind the 
Private AG Statute.62  The court also relied upon a federal district 
court case noting that the private attorney general concept “is based 
on the rationale that counsel fees should be awarded by the court 
when the legal services have provided a benefit to a class of persons, 
not just the particular litigant.”63
Moreover, as the Watpro dissent noted, the consumer protection 
laws are aimed at practices—-a term that denotes fraud victimizing 
58. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 8.
59. Id. at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. See id.
61. Hearing on H.F. 733, H. Comm. Commerce and Econ. Dev., 68th Minn. 
Leg., Mar. 30, 1973 (audio tape) (comments of Rep. Sieben).
62. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313 n.21.
63. Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D. Minn. 1979) (discussing the 
private attorney general concept of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 
1976).
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more than one plaintiff.64  Thus, to meet this purpose of the statute, a 
public benefit is not conferred in isolated instances of fraud.  The 
dissent in Watpro65 and the court in Ly66 focused centrally on this 
purpose, requiring the fraud to “have the potential to deceive and 
ensnare members of the consumer public other than just the 
plaintiff.”67
III. DISSIMILAR TAKES ON SIMILAR STATUTES
While Minnesota is not alone in requiring a private plaintiff to 
prove a public benefit under consumer protection statutes, it is 
certainly in the minority.68  Indeed, such requirements have been the 
subject of harsh criticism as judicially created and unnecessarily 
restrictive to private plaintiffs.69  Regardless of the wisdom of the 
requirement, the search for a standard to measure a public benefit 
logically leads to other states, some of which have similarly struggled 
for a means to analyze the public interest/public benefit requirement 
of their consumer protection statutes.  In this regard, the path of the 
Washington and Colorado courts in interpreting their consumer 
protection statutes70 is particularly instructive to the current state of 
Minnesota law.
A. Washington
  In 1976, the Washington Supreme Court first narrowed the 
scope of a private litigant’s remedy under the Washington Consumer 
64. Watpro, 491 N.W.2d at 10 (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 




68. See Patterson v. Beall, 19 P.3d 839, 847 (Okla. 2000) (noting that a minority 
of states have adopted a public interest element for consumer protection statutes, 
including Colorado, Nebraska, and Washington, and declining to read such a 
requirement into the Oklahoma statute); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. 
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531, 536 (Wash. 1986) (noting that Washington “is very 
clearly in the minority” in requiring a public interest showing of a private plaintiff, 
and citing six states with the requirement).  At least two state legislatures—-
Connecticut and Illinois—-have amended their state consumer protection statute to 
eliminate a judicially created public interest requirement. See Collins v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., 605 F. Supp. 1519 (D. Conn. 1985); Joseph G. Feehan, The Illinois Consumer 
Fraud Act and the “Public Injury” Debate, 80 ILL. B.J. 136 (1992).
69. See Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 536 (“[O]ur public interest requirement has 
been subject to harsh criticism.”) (citations omitted).
70. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.86.010–.920 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101-709
(2002).
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Protection Act by holding that in order to prevail under the statute, a 
plaintiff must show that the conduct complained of would be 
“vulnerable to a complaint by the Attorney General.”71  In other 
words, according to the court, the conduct must affect the public 
interest.72  Four years later, in 1980, the Washington Supreme Court 
noted accurately that “[n]either the legislature nor this court . . . has 
otherwise formulated criteria for determining when” the public 
interest requirement is met.73
The court then developed a three-factor test for determining 
public interest, which it later reconsidered and modified in Hangman
Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Insurance.74  The current test, as set 
forth in Hangman Ridge, requires a court to make a threshold 
determination of whether the transaction was a “consumer
transaction” or a “private dispute.”75 While the distinction between 
these two categories is often less than clear, a consumer transaction is 
usually between a purchaser of goods and a seller, or between an 
individual paying for services and the party rendering them.76
If the transaction is a consumer transaction, the Washington 
71. Lightfoot v. MacDonald, 544 P.2d 88, 90 (Wash. 1976).  There is a private 
right of action under the Washington Consumer Protection Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 
19.86.090 (2002).
72. Lightfoot, 544 P.2d at 90.
73. Anhold v. Daniels, 614 P.2d 184, 187 (Wash. 1980); see also David J. Dove, 
Washington Consumer Protection Act—-Public Interest and the Private Litigant, 60 WASH L.
REV. 201, 202 (1984) (noting that the court in 1976 “did not indicate a criterion that 
would define the public interest and thereby standardize the determination of when 
an injury to a private party would constitute a threat to the public interest”); cf.
Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535 (“Since the Lightfoot decision, the confusion
surrounding private rights of action under the CPA has steadily increased.”).
74. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 535-36.  Before Hangman Ridge, Washington 
courts required proof that the (1) the defendant by unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) the plaintiff suffered 
damage; and (3) the defendant’s deceptive acts or practices have the potential for 
repetition. Anhold, 614 P.2d at 188.  The Hangman Ridge court changed the test 
significantly, noting, “[i]t has become clear that this ‘inducement-damage-repetition’
test is not the best vehicle for showing that the public was or will be affected by the act 
in question.” Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 537.
75. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 537-38.
76. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 733 P.2d 208, 211 (Wash. 1987); see also 
Mason v. Mortgage Am., Inc., 792 P.2d 142, 148 (Wash. 1990) (holding that the 
purchase of a mobile home is a consumer transaction); Travis v. Wash. Horse 
Breeders Ass’n, 759 P.2d 418, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the purchase 
of a race horse at an auction is a consumer transaction); Broten v. May, 744 P.2d 
1085, 1089 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that commission dispute between two 
competing real estate brokers is a private dispute); Aubrey’s R.V. Center, Inc. v. Tandy 
Corp., 731 P.2d 1124, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the purchase of a 
computer system for a business is a consumer transaction).
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court then analyzes the following factors to determine whether a 
public interest is present:
 (1) Were the alleged acts committed in the course of
defendant’s business?
(2) Are the acts part of a pattern or generalized course of 
conduct?
(3) Were repeated acts committed prior to the act involving 
plaintiff?
(4) Is there a real and substantial potential for repetition of 
defendant’s conduct after the act involving plaintiff?
(5) If the act complained of involved a single transaction, were 
many consumers affected or likely to be affected by it?77
Since the Hangman Ridge case, Washington courts have made 
clear that no single factor is dispositive, nor is it necessary that all be 
present.78
Where the transaction is essentially a private dispute, it is more 
difficult—-but not impossible—-to show a public interest under the 
Washington test.  If the transaction is a private dispute, factors 
indicating a public interest include:
(1) Were the alleged acts committed in the course of
defendant’s business?
(2) Did the defendant advertise to the public in general?
(3) Did defendant actively solicit this particular plaintiff,
indicating potential solicitation of others?
(4) Did plaintiff and defendant occupy unequal bargaining 
positions?79
Despite these rather specific factors, the court in Hangman Ridge 
noted more fundamentally that “it is the likelihood that additional 
77. See Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538.
78. Mason, 792 P.2d at 148.  “The factors ‘represent indicia of an effect on public 
interest from which a trier of fact could reasonably find public interest impact.’”
Cotton v. Kronenberg, 44 P.3d 878, 886 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Hangman
Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538).  While courts often analyze and decide whether a public 
interest is present as a matter of law, the determination is a question of fact to be 
made by a trier of fact. See Cotton, 44 P.3d at 886 n.41 (reversing a grant of summary 
judgment because whether a fee agreement impacted the public interest precluded 
summary judgment on consumer protection claim).
79. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538.  The public interest requirement in 
Washington can also be established by a “per se” method, which requires a showing 
that a statute has been violated that contains a specific legislative declaration of a 
public interest impact. Id.  For example, Washington statutes covering the 
distribution and sale of vehicles and the sale of motor vehicle parts both contain 
specific declarations that these subjects affect the public interest. Id. (citing statutes).
16
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plaintiffs have been or will be injured in exactly the same fashion that 
changes a factual pattern from a private dispute to one that affects 
the public interest.”80  The Washington Supreme Court developed 
the Hangman Ridge test to bring closure to increasing questions as to 
the proper application of the public benefit test.  However, the two-
prong multi-factor test it developed may have engendered more 
confusion than clarity.  The threshold inquiry—-whether the
transaction is a “consumer” or a “private” transaction—-muddies the 
waters considerably.  In Minnesota, courts must determine whether 
the plaintiff is a “consumer” in order to resolve whether the plaintiff 
has a claim under the consumer protection statutes.  Thus, the initial 
portion of the Washington test is inapplicable to consideration of 
Minnesota’s Private AG Statute.  The remainder of the Washington 
test, when reduced to its essence, attempts to uncover the number of 
consumers who have been or may be affected by the defendant’s 
practice.
B. Colorado
To prevail on a private cause of action under the Colorado 
Consumer Protection Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
challenged conduct “significantly impacts the public as actual or 
potential consumers of defendant’s goods, services, or property.”81
The statute does not address “purely private wrong[s].”82
In companion cases decided in 1998, the Colorado Supreme 
Court devised a three-factor test to define the element of “public 
interest” in the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.  Under the test, a 
court must consider:
 (1) the number of consumers directly affected by the challenged
practice;
(2) the relative sophistication and bargaining power of
consumers affected by the challenged practice, and
(3) evidence that the challenged practice previously impacted 
other consumers or has significant potential to do so.83
The companion cases reached opposite results under this test.
80. Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538.
81. Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213, 221 (Colo. 1998).  Section 6-1-113 of the 
Colorado Statutes establishes private damages for violations of the Colorado 
Consumer Protection Act. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113(1) (2002).
82. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222.
83. Id.
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In Hall v. Walter,84 a case against subdivision developers, the court 
determined that the defendant developers’ practices implicated the 
public as consumers because their misrepresentations—-in the form 
of advertisement—-were directed to the market generally.85  In 
Martinez v. Lewis,86 a plaintiff brought suit against a doctor retained by 
an insurance company to perform independent medical evaluations, 
arguing that the doctor committed a deceptive trade practice by 
falsely representing his qualifications.  The deception was committed 
against the insurance company, in the context of a private agreement 
with a single consumer in a position of relative bargaining strength.87
Thus, the case did not significantly impact the public, and claims 
under the Consumer Protection Act could not stand.88
Under the Colorado approach, the difference between common 
law fraud and a claim under the Consumer Protection Act lies first in 
the numbers, and second in the experience of the consumer.89  A 
deception that does not affect or have the potential to affect a 
significant number of consumers will not meet the public impact 
requirement of the Consumer Protection Act, and a deception that 
reaches only sophisticated consumers does not fall within the
purposes behind the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.  As the 
court in Martinez noted, the Consumer Protection Act was designed 
to protect the public as consumers “in situations where consumers do 
not have and cannot reasonably gain access to truthful information 
relevant to the contemplated transaction unless it comes from the 
person offering the good, service or property.”90
84. 969 P.2d 224 (Colo. 1998).  The Hall court relied upon the Washington 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hangman Ridge for the general test for stating a cause of
action under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 234.  It then clarified the 
public interest factor: “While the public interest component is longstanding, we now 
recognize that a more precise reading of the statute’s function requires an impact on
the public as consumers of the defendant’s ‘goods, services, or property.’” Id.
(quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105(a)).  The court noted that it would “look to the 
Washington test as a model” for the public interest element. Id.
85. Id. at 235.
86. 969 P.2d 213 (Colo. 1998).
87. Id. at 220-22.
88. Id. at 222-23.
89. See Catherine A. Tallerico, The Colorado Consumer Protection Act: An Update,29
COLO. LAW. 37, 38 (Jan. 2000).
90. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222. This element likely excludes most
business-to-business transactions. See Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc., 85 
F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1007 (D. Colo. 2000).
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IV. A SUGGESTED TEST FOR MINNESOTA
A. Number of Consumers Potentially Affected
The public interest91 hurdle to consumer fraud claims in 
Washington and Colorado has been in place for many years in each 
state.  Courts in each of these states have struggled with defining the 
parameters of this requirement for as many years as it has been in 
place.  Minnesota courts would do well to learn and borrow from this 
history, so as to provide the bench and bar with guidance on the 
requirement announced in Ly v. Nystrom.
Of course, the driving force behind any public benefit standard 
must be the Private AG Statute and its purposes.  The court in Ly, the 
dissent in Watpro, and the Act’s legislative history all suggest that like 
both Colorado and Washington, the critical distinction between 
common law fraud and fraud or deceptive practices covered under 
the consumer protection statues lies in the numbers.92
The purpose behind the Private AG Statute was not to cover “ad 
hoc deceptions arising in private disputes.”93  Rather, the Private AG 
Statute applies to plaintiffs who act as a substitute for the attorney 
general,94 which necessarily means that they are representing other 
consumers who have been or are likely to be injured by the same 
conduct complained of in the private suit.95  Thus, two of the three 
elements of the Colorado test logically apply in Minnesota, such that 
91. The Washington and Colorado courts describe their requirement as a 
“public interest” requirement; Minnesota’s role requires analysis of the potential 
“public benefit.”
92. See Tallerico, supra note 89, at 38.
93. Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 1, 10 
(Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d at 313.  The court stated:
A determination of the scope of the private remedies provision in 
the Private AG Statute must begin with a recognition that it was 
adopted by the legislature in 1973 as part of the statutory charter 
for the duties and responsibilities of the attorney general and 
provides a reward to private parties for uncovering and bringing to 
a halt unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices,
functions that, to that point, had been the responsibility of the 
attorney general.
Id.  “If the attorney general is not authorized to commence a proceeding because it 
would not result in a public benefit then a claimant under the Private AG Statute is 
similarly constrained.” Id. at 314 n.22.
95. See id. at 313 n.21 (noting Representative Sieben’s comment that the 
Private AG Statute is intended to stop those who “rip off a large number of 
citizens”).
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a Minnesota court should consider (1) the number of consumers 
directly affected by the challenged practice; and (2) the evidence that 
the challenged practice previously had impacted other consumers or 
had significant potential to do so in the future.96  This test also 
encompasses much of the Washington analysis, which at its base 
attempts to uncover the number of consumers affected by the 
defendant’s actions.97
The third Colorado factor, which also appears in the
Washington analysis for “private” transactions, instructs the court to 
consider the relative sophistication and bargaining power of the 
parties.98  The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged in both Ly
and Watpro that the Private AG Statute was enacted in part to 
“eliminate financial barriers to the vindication of a plaintiff’s rights.”99
In Ly, the court seemed to add the public interest requirement to the 
statute despite this purpose, rather than because of it, noting the 
reservations of the Watpro dissent and the court of appeals that the 
Private AG Statute could be expanded beyond its intended scope.
Both the Ly majority and the Watpro dissent can be read to suggest 
that an analysis of the sophistication of the parties is not relevant to a 
public benefit.  Nothing about the bargaining power of the parties to 
a private lawsuit speaks to the issue of whether the consumers of 
Minnesota are benefited by a particular plaintiff’s action.  Thus, an 
unsophisticated consumer with little bargaining power should not be 
allowed to make use of the Private AG Statute unless the transaction 
he or she complains of reaches a wider audience, as addressed by the 
96. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222.
97. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 
531, 538 (Wash. 1986).  Many of the factors cited by the Washington Supreme Court 
in the test applying to a consumer transaction question the number of consumers 
reached by the conduct, including whether the act was part of a pattern of conduct, 
whether the acts were repeated, whether there is a potential for repetition, and how 
many consumers were actually affected.  Similarly, the Washington test applicable to a 
“private” transaction questions the number of consumers affected, by asking whether 
the defendant advertised to the public and whether the defendant’s actions indicate 
the potential solicitation of others. Id.
98. Martinez, 969 P.2d at 222; see also id. (“The CCPA provides consumers who 
are in a position of relative bargaining weakness with protection against a range of 
deceptive trade practices.”); Hangman Ridge, 719 P.2d at 538 (holding that when the 
transaction is a private transaction, the court should consider whether the plaintiff 
and defendant occupied unequal bargaining positions).
99. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 311; Church of the Nativity of Our Lord v. Watpro, Inc., 
491 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Minn. 1992) (Simonett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (both quoting Liess v. Lindemyer, 354 N.W.2d 556, 558 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)).
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remainder of the Colorado test.100
B. Attorney General Substitution
Minnesota’s Private AG Statute differs from both the
Washington and the Colorado consumer protection statutes in that 
the public benefit/public interest analysis in Washington and 
Colorado is a part of the consumer protection statutes.  In Minnesota, 
the public benefit test is found in the statute addressing the duties of 
the attorney general, not in the consumer protection statutes, which 
by themselves do not include a private cause of action.  This 
distinction is crucial when considering the standards for the public 
benefit test.  “[T]he sweep of the statute can be no broader than the 
source of its authority”; thus, a Minnesota plaintiff can only bring a 
claim under the Private AG Statute if the attorney general could also 
bring a claim.101  The Minnesota test should therefore include an 
analysis of whether the attorney general would view the lawsuit as 
suiting a public purpose and the interests of the state.102
V. CONCLUSION
To be consistent with the principles announced in Ly and the 
purposes behind the Private AG Statute, Minnesota courts should 
consider the number of consumers directly affected or likely to be 
affected by the defendant’s actions, and whether the attorney general 
has the authority to bring the suit the plaintiff proposes.  Such a test 
provides guidance to courts, is faithful to the legislative history of the 
statute, and assists in winnowing out those enterprising plaintiffs who, 
through claims under the Private AG Statute, seek to expand the 
consumer protection laws beyond their intended scope.
100. See, e.g., Gray v. Conrad, Nos. C7-97-1784, C0-98-177, 1998 WL 404951, at *6 
(Minn. Ct. App. July 21, 1998) (determining that an individual plaintiff could not 
bring a claim under the Private AG Statute because the case was “totally fact-specific,”
and the “protection of public consumers at large [was] not implicated”).
101. Ly, 615 N.W.2d at 313.
102. Id. (noting that “[t]he duty of the attorney general’s office, and thus the 
purpose of any statute granting private citizens authority to bring a lawsuit in lieu of 
the attorney general, is the protection of public rights and the preservation of the 
interests of the state”).  This purpose of the statute reinforces the exclusion of 
consideration of the relative sophistication of the parties, which does not affect 
“public rights and the preservation of interests of the state.” Id.
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